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the	 information	within	 such	a	qualifying	 framework	as	 they	are	not	 the	 generators	of	 the	
information	nor	did	they	collect	it	in	the	first	place.		
	




of	 owning	 the	 servers,	 databases	 and	 the	 ability	 to	 control,	 store	 and	 process.	 That	 they	
have	intellectual	property	rights	over	the	information	and	therefore	hold	entitlements,	is	not	
disputed.	 If	 individuals	 have	 the	 same	 capability,	 and	 therefore	 also	 be	 able	 to	 hold	
entitlements,	how	then	should	the	system	of	property	be	constructed?		
	
Of	 course,	 having	 the	 ability	 to	 hold	 entitlements	 is	 not	 the	 same	 as	 actually	 having	 the	
information,	since	much	of	the	information	individuals	may	wish	to	own	reside	elsewhere.		
	
Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 an	 important	 starting	 position	 as	 the	 ability	 of	 individuals	 to	 hold	
entitlements	 brings	 about	 their	 ability	 to	 contract	 on	 their	 entitlements	 and	 that	 makes	




optimal	 for	 social	 welfare,	 societal	 outcomes	 and	 may	 create	 other	 externalities.	 Yet,	 a	








the	 subject	matter	 of	 this	 paper	 -	 that	 of	 personal	 information	 -	may	 impose	 inalienable	
restrictions	 on	 transferability,	 ownership,	 and	 its	 use	 by	 legal	 persons	 may	 differ	
contractually	if	legal	persons	are	natural	persons	contracting	for	themselves.	
	
This	paper	begins	with	 the	axiomatic	principle	 -	 that	natural	 persons	 can	be	 legal	persons	










An	 important	 clarification	 of	 the	 axiom	 is	 that	 we	 are	 not	 proposing	 that	 information	 be	
propertized;	 extant	 literature	 has	 discussed	 extensively	 on	 the	 negative	 consequences	 of	
such	 a	 concept	 including,	 for	 example,	 incentivising	 privacy	 for	 sale	 etc.	 Liddell	 et	 al's	
treatment	of	the	issue	is	comprehensive	in	why	that	is	a	bad	idea.	Instead,	our	axiom	is	on	
rights	 over	 information	 held	 at	 rest	 with	 the	 same	 processing,	 computation	 and	 storage	
capability	of	organisations;	the	ability	to	use	and	to	transfer,	the	right	to	exclude,	the	right	to	
give	rights;	in	other	words,	entitlement	not	of	propertized	information,	but	to	the	qualifying	
framework	within	which	 the	 information	 resides	 in,	 such	 as	 a	 database	 operated	 on	with	
processing	capabilities	such	as	a	server.		
	
By	entitlement,	we	mean	 legal	 entitlements	 that	 are	expressed	 in	most	work	on	property	





the	 ownership,	 use	 and	 transferability	 of	 their	 property.	 These	 restrictions	 can	 be	 due	 to	






















































the	 information	 by	 the	 entitlement	 holder	 is	 permitted	with	 nothing	 required.		 There	 are	





















the	 externality	 problems	 of	 2.A.b	 by	 "internalizing"	 the	 externalities	 through	 a	 "separate	
facilities"	 solution.	 Property	 relationships	 are	 rearranged	 so	 that	 those	who	produced	 the	
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that	 all	 property	 rights	 over	 information	 belong	 to	 any	 legal	 person	 that	 collects	 it.	 That	













The	 2.A.a	 property	 system	 was	 operationalised	 through	 the	 invention	 of	 the	 HAT	
Microserver	or	a	Personal	Data	Server	(PDS),	an	open	sourced	technology	created	through	a	
research	project	of	 6	U.K.	universities	 that	provided	 individuals	with	entitlements	 through	
the	legal	ownership	of	the	server	and	its	corresponding	storage	system.	The	technology	was	
commercialised	by	Dataswift,	a	U.K.	deep	tech	startup	in	Cambridge	that	deployed	the	open	
sourced	 technology	 into	 a	 patented	 infrastructure	 platform	 to	 scale	 the	Data	 Servers	 and	
provide	a	Personal	Data	Account	(PDA,	a	subset	of	the	PDS)	Management	System	that	could	
be	 provisioned	 on	 demand	 for	 any	 application	 or	website.	 The	 platform	 also	 comprised	 a	
policy	stack	to	ensure	information	flows	are	safe.	This	enabled	individuals	to	have	the	ability	
to	 store,	 control,	 process,	 and	 share	 their	 data	 through	 personal	 data	 accounts.	 The	
technology	began	rolling	out	in	2020.	The	author	is	the	CEO	and	the	primary	inventor	of	the	





Data	 portability	 in	 the	 current	 2.A.b	 property	 system	 is	 presented	 below.	 In	 this	 system,	
individuals	 do	 not	 hold	 entitlements	 and	 therefore	 have	 to	 consent	 to	 their	 data	 being	
shared.	 I	 assume	 firms	 that	 wish	 to	 obtain	 data	 wish	 to	 do	 so	 to	 improve	 customer	



























































































































to	 exist	 to	 ensure	 safety	 in	 transaction	 although	 the	 intervention	 would	 be	 different	 to	
achieve	the	same	outcomes.	Coordination	costs	are	 likely	higher	 in	2.A.a	but	 the	ability	 to	




Most	 importantly,	 the	 treatment	 of	 externalities,	 namely	 privacy,	 would	 be	 different.	 For	
2.A.b,	 inalienable	 rules	 such	 as	 consent	 and	 data	 protections	 are	 imposed	 for	 the	
transferability	 of	 information.	 However	 for	 2.A.a	 where	 private	 contracts	 are	 allowed,	
different	kinds	of	 interventions	might	be	needed,	 for	example	 reducing	coordination	costs	
through	private	contracts	with	agents,	 since	entitlements	can	be	held.	 It	 is	 therefore	clear	
that	the	market	rules	for	2.A.b	and	2.A.a	property	systems	would	be	quite	different.		
	
Another	 key	 difference	 between	 2.A.b	 and	 2.A.a	 property	 system	 is	 the	 focus	 on	
entitlements	v	the	actual	 information.	2.A.b	property	system	has	the	conundrum	of	not	all	
parties	being	able	 to	hold	entitlements,	and	 therefore	 the	 information	 itself	has	 to	be	 the	
focus,	and	that	brings	tremendous	challenges	in	the	management	of	externalities	as	well	as	
coordination	and	transaction	costs	well	established	in	literature.	2.A.a,	conversely,	does	not	
have	 such	 a	 constraint,	 and	 therefore	 it	manages	 the	 information	 assets	 from	within	 the	
entitlements,	which	should	lower	transaction	costs.	However,	the	externalities,	coordination	
problems	 and	 distributive	 goals	 of	 2.A.b	 loom	 just	 as	 large	 for	 2.A.a	 and	 they	 would	 be	
salient	market	design	issues.	However,	the	biggest	challenge	of	2.A.a	is	to	enable	bargaining	
 





not	be	 too	costly	 for	 the	 firms.	 Indeed	Cañon	and	Ng	 (2021)	demonstrated	 that	 the	2.A.b	
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